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Themoral foundations theory (MFT) is an influential multifactorial model that posits how
decision-making in the moral context originates from a set of six intuitive moral
foundations: care, fairness, authority, loyalty, purity, and liberty. The established measure of
these foundations—the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ)—has been used
extensively in a range of empirical projects. However, recent analyses of its factor
structure and the internal consistency of each of the foundation clusters have called its
validity into question. In this paper, data from a large sample of British voterswere used to
re-examine the factor structure of the MFQ. As opposed to a 6-factor structure, only
three meaningful clusters emerged in an exploratory principal factors analysis (Study 1;
N = 428): traditionalism, compassion, and liberty. This structure was broadly confirmed in
an independent sample (Study 2; N = 322). Concurrent validity was established via
correlations with measures of ‘social change’ and ‘systemic inequality’ insecurities (Study
1) and voting behaviour and preferences (Study 2). Significant differences on each of the
three factors of the revisedMFQ (MFQ-r) were observed between the voters of different
political parties (Study 1) and sides of the Brexit issue (Study 2). Implications for moral
foundations theory and its measurement are discussed.
Moral foundations theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) is a theoretical framework of moral
decision-making. It has been applied to a range of areas of study, such as self-identified
political ideology (Clifford, 2017; Franks & Scherr, 2015; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;
Graham, Nosek, &Haidt, 2012; Haidt &Graham, 2007; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, &Haidt,
2012; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015), specific sociopolitical attitudes and behaviours (Barnett,
€Oz, & Marsden, 2018; Dickinson, McLeod, Bloomfield, & Allred, 2016; Low & Wui, 2016),
public health messaging (Christie et al., 2019), judgements of crime (Harper & Harris, 2017;
Silver & Silver, 2017; Vaughan, Holleran, & Silver, 2019), and perceptions of leadership and
business ethics (e.g., Egorov, Kalshoven, Pircher Verdorfer, & Peus, 2020). The theory is
grounded in cultural and evolutionary psychology and anthropology and is designed to
provide a universal conceptualization of the human moral landscape (Dogruyol, Alper, &
Yilmaz, 2019). Three core principles underpin the MFT (see Haidt, 2012), namely that:
1. Moral judgements are made using intuitive processes, with our verbal explanations
representing post-hoc justifications of choices made non-consciously and instinc-
tively (for a theoretical conceptualization of this process, see Haidt, 2001). This first
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premise stems from seminal work by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), who argued
how heuristic-based intuitive cognition drives decision-making.
2. Morality is a multidimensional construct comprised of a discrete set of moral
foundations. These foundations represent the core moral domains within which a
given stimulus or scenario is appraised.
3. The relative importance attributed to respective moral dimensions is variable across
the population.
The multidimensionality of morality within the context of the MFT was postulated by
Haidt and Joseph (2004), who suggested four suchmoral intuitions: preventing suffering
(care), respecting hierarchies (authority), acting reciprocally (fairness), and behaving
purely (purity). These formed thebasis of the first draft of theMFT,withHaidt andGraham
(2007) advocating for a fifth domain: affinity to one’s group (loyalty). This led to a theory
comprisedof fivemoral foundations, defined as the core innate domains ofmoral decision-
making (Haidt, 2012). In the ensuing years, Iyer et al. (2012) posited that a desire for
autonomy and freedom (liberty) could also be classified as a moral domain, bringing the
number of moral foundations to six. It is worth noting here that MFT is not the only
theoretical account of morality within the psychological literature. Some researchers
advocate single-factor conceptualizations of morality, with harm being the most salient
factor (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Alternatively, Curry’s theory of ’morality-as-
cooperation’ suggests a 7-factor model of morality, based on seven different types of
cooperation (Curry, Jones Chesters, & Van Lissa, 2019). However, the most commonly
cited and studied approach to understanding humanmorality is theMFT, hence our focus
on this framework here.
TheMFT has perhaps beenmost influential within the political domain. Here,multiple
research teams have consistently reported differences in the endorsement of the moral
foundations between ideological and partisan groups from across the political spectrum
(for a popular review, see Haidt, 2012). Across cultures, liberals are said to endorse a ‘two-
channel’ view of morality, with the focus in these individuals being on caring for themost
vulnerable in society and acting fairly or equitably, whereas conservatives value all five of
the original moral foundations at around the same level (see Graham et al., 2009, 2011,
2012; Johnson et al., 2017;Kugler, Jost,&Noorbaloochi, 2014; Rempala,Okdie,&Garvey,
2016). These high-level ideological differences are also observable in self-reported voting
preferences, with the leftward voting being predicted by higher levels of endorsement of
‘individualizing’ (care and fairness) foundations and rightward voting by endorsement of
‘binding’ (authority, loyalty, and purity) foundations (Franks & Scherr, 2015; Milesi,
2017). Among self-identified libertarians, Iyer et al. (2012) reported levels of endorsement
of the care and fairness foundations that were more consistent with ideological liberals,
but with a heavy focus also being placed on themes related to economic and lifestyle
liberty. Even on these two liberty dimensions, an asymmetry betweenpartisan liberals and
conservatives was observed, with conservatives endorsing economic liberty (e.g.,
property rights) more than lifestyle liberty (e.g., opposition to culturally enforced social
norms), with liberals showing the opposite trend (Iyer et al., 2012).
These relationships between moral foundations and political attitudes do not
necessarily reflect an underlying causal mechanism. Instead, these associations may be
reflective of the framing of the items on theMoral FoundationsQuestionnaire (MFQ). In an
example of this, Voelkel and Brandt (2019) demonstrated howmanipulating the targets of
moral behaviour changed the relationships between some moral foundations (e.g.,
loyalty) with political ideology. That is, instead of asking about loyalty to one’s country
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(a conservative instinct), Voelkel and Brandt (2019) found high rates of liberal ‘loyalty’
endorsement by asking about loyalty to one’s labour union. Findings such as these led
Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith (2019) to suggest that ‘moral foundations do not cause or
meaningfully predict political ideology. Political orientations are more stable across time
than moral foundations, and moral foundations are more likely a product of political
orientations rather than the reverse’ (pp. 803–804).
Construct measurement within the context of the MFT usually takes the form of the
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ;Graham et al., 2009). This is a 32-item scale (with
only 30 of these being scored because of two ‘catch’ questions designed to identify
inattentive or random responding). These items are divided into two sections. In the first
section, respondents state how relevant a collection of issues are to themwhenmaking a
moral decision. Examples of such issues include ‘Whether or not someone suffered
emotionally’ (mapping on to the care foundation) and ‘Whether or not someone did
something disgusting’ (mapping on to the purity foundation). The second section of the
MFQ asks respondents to rate their level of agreementwith a range of moral statements,
such as ‘Justice is the most important requirement for a society’ (mapping on to the
fairness foundation) and ‘It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself’
(mapping on to the loyalty foundation). Scoring occurs by averaging the responses to each
of the six items per moral foundation.
In spite of the MFQ continuing to be used as the gold-standard measure of moral
foundations, the scale itself has come in for criticism. For example, recent confirmatory
factor analyses have found only reasonable levels of model fit when using the default five-
foundation model (comparative fit indices [CFIs] < 0.90; root mean square error of
approximation [RMSEA] > 0.08; Iurino & Saucier, 2020; Kim, Kang, & Yun, 2012;
Kivikangas, L€onnqvist, & Ravaja, 2017; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Yilmaz, Harma,
Bahcekapili, & Cesur, 2016), with fit indices only improving to acceptable standards upon
the removal of low-loading items (Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015). In a large-scale analysis of
measurement invariance in the 20-item short form of the MFQ, Iurino and Saucier (2020)
found that the5-factormodel didnot translatewell across 27countries fromnineglobal areas
(though see Brandt, He, &Bender, 2020 for data suggesting that a lack of invariance does not
impact theconclusionsdrawnin relation to ideological differences).They also suggested that
theMFQ (or, at least, the short form of themeasure)may onlymeasure two factors related to
harm and social order. These correspond to the two higher order ‘individualizing’ and
‘binding’ foundation clusters that have been theoretically suggested in prior work (Franks &
Scherr, 2015; Milesi, 2017). These findings cast doubt on the generalizability of MFT’s
proposed 5-factor structure. Although there is little reason to doubt the translatability of this
analysis to the full MFQ (for evidence of the cross-cultural stability of theMFQ, see Dogruyol
et al., 2019), nowork has been conducted that seeks to re-examine the dimensionality of the
full MFQ alongside the newer liberty items from Iyer et al. (2012).
Similar issues with fit have also been reported at the individual foundation level (Davis,
Dooley,Hook,Choe,&McElroy, 2017).While these questionable fit indicesmaybe reflective
of a conceptual difficulty in operationalizing and quantifying moral intuitions in a more
general sense, they do call into question the utility of the MFQ in its current 5-factor form.
Further, among studies that have not explicitly tested the fit of the 5-factormodel of theMFQ,
the internal consistency of each of themoral foundations (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha coefficients)
has produced poor coefficients: care foundation a = .50–.62 (Graham et al., 2009; Harper &
Hogue, 2019); fairness foundation a = .39–.69 (Graham et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Harper &
Hogue, 2019); authority foundation a = .39–.64 (Graham et al., 2009); loyalty foundation
a = .24–.58 (Grahamet al., 2009, 2012); andpurity foundationa = .58 (Grahamet al., 2009).
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As alluded above, previous work into the MFT’s proposed 5-factor model tended to
support a 2-factor liberal-conservative (usually referred to as ‘binding’ and ‘individualiz-
ing’ moral domains, respectively; Franks & Scherr, 2015; Graham et al., 2009, Graham
et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2017; Kugler et al., 2014; Milesi, 2017;
Rempala et al., 2016). Here, we replicate that previous research and extend it to include,
for the first time, a third politico-moral domain factor representing libertarianism by
integrating Iyer et al.’s (2012) liberty items into the MFQ. The aforementioned
measurement issues provide a clear rationale for taking a different approach to
understanding the factor structure of the MFQ. In this paper, a reanalysis of this factor
structure is undertaken. Specifically, instead of attempting to confirm the predefined
default 5- or 6-factor structure, newparallel and exploratory factor analyses provide a new
look at the factor structure of the MFQ, taking into account the liberty items published by
Iyer et al. (2012). A reanalysed structure is also confirmed in an independent sample.
Concurrent validity of a new factor structure is provided, alongside information about
how such a reframing of the MFQ relates to the British political context.
STUDY 1
In Study 1,we aim to achieve two goals. First, we reanalyse the factor structure of theMFQ
after embedding Iyer et al.’s (2012) liberty-related items. Second, we offer some evidence
of the concurrent validity of the revised structure in an exploratory analysis of its
associations with sociopolitical constructs and voting behaviour. This was an important
additional process owing to the known links between MFT and political attitudes and
voting behaviour (Franks & Scherr, 2015; Graham et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Johnson et al.,
2017; Kugler et al., 2014; Milesi, 2017; Rempala et al., 2016).
Methods
Participants
Participants in this study were drawn from a broader project looking at the psychological
underpinnings of political behaviour in the United Kingdom, specifically in relation to the
Brexit vote. This previous work was designed to understand the various predictors of
voting in the 2016 referendum of EU membership and is reported in Harper and Hogue
(2019). The sample used here are all those participants who fully completed the MFQ
(plus liberty items from Iyer et al., 2012). As such, 428 participants (70% male;
Mage = 33.54 years, SD = 14.13) are included in the analyses that follow. Most were
educated to degree level (60%) and intended to vote ‘Remain’ prior to the EU referendum
in June 2016 (61%). In terms of voting preferences at the previous UK general election in
2015, participants tended to favour left-leaning parties, such as Labour (32%), the Liberal
Democrats (11%), or the Green Party (11%). However, there was representation from the
right-hand side of the political spectrum, with support for the Conservatives (15%), UKIP
(independence party; 11%), and ‘others’ (e.g., smaller fringe parties or independent
candidates; 5%). Around 13% of the sample did not vote in the 2015 general election.
For the broader project, a varied sampling strategy was employed in order to attract a
politically diverse sample. This included posting study advertisements on general
community groups on Facebook (encompassing several regions of the United Kingdom,
including both urban and rural settings), the use of Twitter using #EUref and #Brexit, and
placing study announcements on Reddit forums for each of the five main political parties
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in the United Kingdom (the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Green
Party, and UKIP), as well as fora that were specifically devoted to discussions of British
politics and the EU referendum. All advertisements encouraged viewers to share the link
in order to facilitate the collection of a large and varied sample.
Measures
Demographic questionnaire
Participants provided personal information about their sex, age, level of education
(pre-/post-degree), party vote at the last general election, planned vote in the EU
referendum, and their general political views (measured using an 11-point scale anchored
from 5 to +5; negative scores = liberal, positive scores = conservative).
Moral foundations questionnaire
The 32-item MFQ (Graham et al., 2009) was administered to examine participants’
endorsement of each of established moral foundations (care, fairness, authority, loyalty,
and purity). Each foundation is assessed using six items, with these being scored using a 6-
point Likert scale. Two ‘catch’ questions are also included to check that participants are
paying attention to the scale when responding and to encourage participants to use the
extremes of the Likert scales. Average foundation scores and Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients for each foundation (see Table 1) were computed using the syntax posted
by the scale authors at MoralFoundations.org. The original MFQwas accompanied by Iyer
et al.’s (2012) nine items for measuring endorsement of the liberty foundation. These
items were randomly placed (within their respective half of the MFQ) among the other
items in order to avoid biased responding, with all items then being randomized for each
participant. As demonstrated in Table 1, the internal consistency across the foundations
was variable, though this was slightly better within the present sample than in previous
research using the MFQ.
Ontological insecurities scale
We used the 14-item 2-factor Ontological Insecurities Scale (OIS; Harper & Hogue, 2017)
in order to examine insecurities about ‘social change’ (e.g., ‘The pace of social change is
too quick’; a = 0.94) and ‘systemic inequality’ (e.g., ‘We live in a fair society’; a = 0.65).
Each item is rated on a 6-point Likert scale, anchored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). Average scores are computed for each subscale, with high scores being
indicative of greater insecurity. This measurewas used as it offers a less politically explicit
measure of themes that, according to Harper and Hogue’s (2017) development data, are
related to right-wing authoritarianism (r with ‘social change’ insecurities = 0.81,
p < .001) and having a social dominance orientation (r with ‘systemic inequality’
insecurities = 0.35, p < .01).
Procedure
Advertisements containing a link to a survey looking at ‘British political attitudes’ were
placed in various locations online, as indicated previously. Those who were interested in
taking part clicked on the survey weblink (hosted by Qualtrics) and were presented with
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an overview of the project. Explicit informed consent was indicated by participants
clicking a confirmation button. All participants first provided their demographic
information, before completing the MFQ and OIS in a randomized order. This procedure
received ethical approval from a departmental review committee prior to data collection
and conformed to British Psychological Society ethical standards.
Results
An anonymized version of the data set (in.omv format) is available for download at https://
osf.io/nwpb6/.
Parallel and exploratory factor analysis
Aparallel analysiswas run on the data for the 41-itemMFQ (the original 32 items, plus nine
liberty items) to determine the likely number of factors underpinning the data. This
analysis was performed using syntax provided by O’Connor (2000), which takes multiple
simulations of a principal component analysis (PCA) to calculate mean component
eigenvalues. If an observed eigenvalue (from the actual data set) of a component exceeds
the size of the 95th percentile of the eigenvalue distribution (from the simulations), this
represents a statistically meaningful component. As demonstrated in Figure 1, this
parallel analysis indicated that five factors underpinned the data.
Owing to the parallel analysis output, an exploratory factor analysis (using maximum
likelihood extraction with varimax rotation) was run with the instruction to extract five
factors. The sample size of 428 is suitable for this type of analysis, exceeding the five-
observations-per-item rule of thumb (Osborne, Costello, & Kellow, 2008). Further, the
Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (0.87) and Bartlett’s test for
sphericity (v2(741) = 6410, p < .001) suggested that the data were suitable for testing
dimensionality.
The results of the exploratory factor analysis are presented in Table 2. As can be seen,
this analysis led to three psychometrically strong factors, a fourth containing only two
items that cross-loaded onto the first factor, and afifth factor consisting of only three items.
As such, a 3-factor structure was accepted for further interrogation. In order to retain as
many items as possible while still producing a measure that was not skewed in favour of
any particular factor, the top-loading ten items of the first factor were retained. Initial
analyses demonstrated acceptable levels of model fit (RMSEA = 0.05, TLI = 0.85,
Table 1. Average moral foundation scores and internal consistency of the original form MFQ
Foundation Example item M (SD) a
Care ‘Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue’ 4.36 (0.81) .64
Fairness ‘I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money
while poor children inherit nothing’
4.63 (0.71) .63
Authority ‘Respect for authority is something all children need to learn’ 3.39 (0.98) .76
Loyalty ‘People should be loyal to their family members, even when they
have done something wrong’
3.16 (0.90) .74
Purity ‘I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are
unnatural’
2.64 (1.05) .81
Liberty ‘The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives’ 3.94 (0.89) .73
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v2(556) = 1194, p < .001). It is important to highlight that this 3-factor structure is
inconsistent with the parallel analysis. However, the need to develop a parsimonious and
conceptually coherent measure made this deviation from the parallel analysis necessary.
The first factor was labelled ‘Traditionalism’ and was comprised of items such as
‘Respect for authority is something all children need to learn’ and ‘Whether or not
someone conformed to the traditions of society’. This cluster of items relate to the binding
principles of loyalty to one’s ingroup and the development of social norms (Cronbach’s
a = 0.88; McDonald’s x = 0.88).
The second factorwas labelled ‘Compassion’ and contained items such as ‘Whether or
not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable’ and ‘Whether or not someone
suffered emotionally’. This cluster pertains to the individualizing principles of respect for
individuality, fair treatment, and the elimination of judgements based on established social
hierarchy or group membership (Cronbach’s a = 0.76, McDonald’s x = 0.77).
The third factor was labelled ‘Liberty’ and contained items such as ‘The government
interferes far too much in our everyday lives’ and ‘People who are successful in business
have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit’. This collection of items exclusively came
from Iyer et al.’s (2012) liberty questionnaire, suggesting that these items related to a
distinct orientation towards individuality and freedom from external control (Cronbach’s
a = 0.72; McDonald’s x = 0.73).
Concurrent validity of the revised MFQ
To test the concurrent validity of the revised MFQ (the ‘MFQ-r’), the three factors were
correlated against each other, as well as against the age and political orientation
demographic variables, and the ‘social change’ and ‘systemic inequality’ OIS factors
(Table 3).
As expected, ‘Traditionalism’ was associated with older age, political conservatism,
higher levels of insecurity with social change, and lower levels of concern about systemic
inequalities. These relationships provide evidence that the ‘Traditionalism’ factor appears
Figure 1. Parallel analysis of the 41-item MFQ.
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Table 2. Item loadings within the exploratory factor analysis of the 41-item MFQ
Item
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect
for authority
0.744 0.081 0.076 0.142 0.023
Respect for authority is something all children need
to learn
0.743 0.120 0.015 0.078 0.160
People should not do things that are disgusting, even
if no one is harmed
0.673 0.144 0.077 0.105 0.367
Whether or not someone violated standards of
purity and decency
0.653 0.091 0.061 0.226 0.087
Whether or not someone did something disgusting 0.645 0.233 0.024 0.191 0.103
Whether or not someone conformed to the
traditions of society
0.618 0.014 0.003 0.504 0.179
I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that
they are unnatural
0.580 0.159 0.029 0.228 0.162
Chastity is an important and valuable virtue 0.512 0.141 0.053 0.269 0.061
Whether or not private property was respected 0.498 0.305 0.305 0.048 0.287
Whether or not someone’s action showed love for
his or her country
0.492 0.006 0.169 0.479 0.064
If I were a soldier and disagreed with my
commanding officer’s orders, I would obey anyway
because that is my duty
0.490 0.149 0.113 0.126 0.009
Whether or not an action caused chaos or disorder 0.487 0.297 0.008 0.073 0.096
I am proud of my country’s history 0.476 0.203 0.311 0.150 0.147
I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a
lot of money while poor children inherit nothing
0.413 0.293 0.233 0.130 0.276
Men and women each have different roles to play in
society
0.347 0.240 0.156 0.178 0.138
Whether or not someone acted unfairly 0.013 0.669 0.004 0.059 0.045
Whether or not someone was cruel 0.185 0.653 0.073 0.043 0.090
Whether or not someone was denied his or her
rights
0.170 0.650 0.097 0.149 0.049
Whether or not some people were treated
differently than others
0.082 0.552 0.040 0.122 0.235
Whether or not someone cared for someone weak
or vulnerable
0.040 0.501 0.078 0.288 0.249
Whether or not someone suffered emotionally 0.027 0.419 0.202 0.084 0.323
Whether or not everyone was free to do as they
wanted
0.089 0.388 0.352 0.008 0.067
Society works best when it lets individuals take
responsibility for their own lives without telling
them what to do
0.011 0.088 0.744 0.174 0.024
I think everyone should be free to do as they choose,
so long as they don’t infringe upon the equal
freedoms of others
0.205 0.167 0.670 0.009 0.097
People who are successful in business have a right to
enjoy their wealth as they see fit
0.485 0.187 0.530 0.052 0.095
The government interferes far too much in our
everyday lives
0.177 0.083 0.482 0.144 0.035
Continued




1 2 3 4 5
Property owners should be allowed to develop their
land or build their homes in anyway they choose, as
long as they don’t endanger their neighbours
0.110 0.168 0.439 0.027 0.073
The government should do more to advance the
common good, even if that means limiting the
freedom and choices of individuals
0.015 0.023 0.407 0.053 0.203
People should be free to decide what group norms
or traditions they themselves want to follow
0.166 0.212 0.392 0.132 0.231
Justice is the most important requirement for a
society
0.241 0.114 0.251 0.125 0.242
Whether or not someone showed a lack of loyalty 0.389 0.157 0.124 0.648 0.078
Whether or not someone did something to betray
his or her group
0.353 0.181 0.114 0.632 0.098
People should be loyal to their family members, even
when they have done something wrong
0.274 0.126 0.157 0.391 0.141
Whether or not someone acted in a way that God
would approve of
0.311 0.122 0.086 0.337 0.069
It is more important to be a team player than to
express oneself
0.241 0.054 0.101 0.243 0.236
Compassion for those who are suffering is the most
crucial virtue
0.087 0.391 0.147 0.016 0.526
It can never be right to kill a human being 0.090 0.075 0.024 0.080 0.480
When the government makes laws, the number one
principle should be ensuring that everyone is
treated fairly
0.079 0.323 0.121 0.140 0.434
One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a
defenceless animal
0.114 0.081 0.085 0.080 0.353
Significantly loading items (>.40; Field, 2018) are underlined. Retained items in the preliminary scale are
presented in bold typeface.
Table 3. Zero-order correlations demonstrating concurrent validity of the MFQ-r
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. MFQ-r ‘Traditionalism’ – .05 .25*** .29*** .58*** .58*** .29***
2. MFQ-r ‘Compassion’  .15** .03 .36*** .34*** .29***
3. MFQ-r ‘Liberty’  .03 .35*** .30*** .38***
4. Age  .12* .17*** .04
5. Political Orientation – .69*** .41***
6. OIS ‘Social Change’ – .26***
7. OIS ‘Systemic Inequality’ –
M 3.07 4.51 4.10 33.54 1.66 2.73 3.89
SD 1.01 0.79 .087 14.13 2.78 1.21 0.91
‘MFQ-r’ and ‘OIS’ scores range from 1 to 6 (high scores indicate endorsement of moral domains, and
more insecurities, respectively). Political orientation’ ranges from5 (very liberal) to+5 (very conservative).
*p < .05,; **p < .01,; ***p < .001.
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to be related to a conservative sociopolitical orientation. In contrast, ‘Compassion’ was
unrelated to age, but correlated with political liberalism, lower levels of insecurity about
social change, and higher levels of concern about system inequality. As such,
‘Compassion’ appears to be related to a more left-leaning sociopolitical orientation. The
‘Liberty’ factor was associated with political conservatism, greater levels of insecurity
about social change, and lower levels of concern about systemic inequality. This pattern
mirrors that of the ‘Traditionalism’ factor, albeitwith a lesser focus on traditionalmeasures
of ideology and a greater focus on the forceful redistribution of social equalities.
Although the MFQ-r factors were correlated with each other in the expected
directions, these relationships are generally small in terms of their absolute magnitude.
Predictive validity of the revised MFQ (Study 1)
To examine the predictive validity of the MFQ-r, a binary logistic regression was run to
predict self-reported EU referendum voting intentions. Participant demographic infor-
mation (sex, age, and education), self-reported political orientation, OIS factor scores, and
the three factors of the MFQ-r were entered as predictors. Further, one-way analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to establish differences in the endorsement of the
MFQ-rmoral domains between those voting for identifiable parties in the 2015UK general
election. These analyseswere exploratory in nature and designed to provide an indication
of the validity of the MFQ-r. As such, we did not make any formal hypotheses, and the
results should be considered indicative and in need of independent replication.
Predicting EU referendum voting intentions
The model predicting EU referendum voting intentions was statistically significant,
predicting variability in voting intentions, v2(9) = 194, p < .001, and Nagelkerke pseudo
R
2 = .512. Themodel accurately classified 79%of the sample into the ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’
voter categories and was more accurate when predicting an intended ‘Remain’ vote
(87.1%) than ‘Leave’ (67.1%). Multicollinearity was not present with VIF (all < 2.50) and
tolerance values (all > 0.40) being acceptable. Model coefficients are presented in
Table 4.
Examining the model coefficients, none of the demographic variables of sex, age, or
education predicted EU referendum voting intention. Political conservatism, ‘social
change insecurities’, and the ‘Liberty’ factor of the MFQ-r all predicted an increased
likelihood of voting ‘Leave’. None of the other variables were significantly associatedwith
referendum voting intentions.
For comparison, in Harper and Hogue (2019)—where these data originate—using the
6-factor MFQ (plus liberty) model yielded a Nagelkerke pseudo R2 value of .468, which is
slightly lower than the .512 outcome using theMFQ-r. In this earlier work,MFQ factors on
‘Care’ and ‘Liberty’ predicted voting intentions in the directions of ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’,
respectively. The same relationships between voting intentions and ideology and ‘social
change insecurities’ were also present in Harper and Hogue (2019).
Party voting differences on the MFQ-r
One-way ANOVAswere run to assesswhetherMFQ-r factor scores differed as a function of
the political party participants voted for in the 2015 UK general election. In this analysis,
only those participants with an identifiable party vote (i.e., an explicitly declared vote for
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the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, or the Green Party) were included.
This excluded those who voted for ‘other’ parties/candidates (owing to the range of
potential ideological positions that these parties and candidates could occupy across the
political spectrum), and those who ‘did not vote’.
There was a significant effect of ‘party vote’ on all dependent variables: ‘Tradition-
alism’, F(4, 340) = 28.10, p < .001, partial g2 = 0.25; ‘Compassion’, v2(4) = 37.50,
p < .001, e2 = 0.11; ‘Liberty’, F(4, 340) = 16.80, p < .001, partial g2 = 0.17. Descriptive
statistics are presented in Table 5.
Post-hoc comparisons were calculated with p values amended using the Bonferroni
correction. These comparisons are also presented in Figure 2.
In relation to ‘Traditionalism’, those who voted Conservative scored significantly
higher than all other party voters (all ps < .001, ds > 1.09) with the exception of UKIP
voters (p = .100, d = 0.15). Labour voters scored lower than those who voted for the
Conservatives (p < .001, d = 0.1.09) and UKIP (p < .001, d = 0.94), but higher than
those who voted for the Green Party (p = .010, d = 0.55). Liberal Democrat voters
differed only from Conservative (p < .001, d = 1.14) and UKIP (p < .001, d = 0.99)
voters, scoring lower than both of these groups. Those who voted for the Green Party
scored lower on this MFQ-r factor than all other groups (all ps < .010; ds = 0.55–1.64),
with the exception of those voting for the Liberal Democrats (p = .143, d = 0.50).
Table 4. Binary logistic regression predicting EU referendum vote intention using the MFQ-r
B (SE) p OR 95% CI (OR)
Sex 0.24 (0.34) .471 1.27 [0.66, 2.46]
Age 0.01 (0.01) .636 1.01 [0.98, 1.03]
Education 0.08 (0.28) .785 1.08 [0.62, 1.88]
Political Orientation 0.25 (0.07) <.001 1.28 [1.12, 1.48]
OIS ‘Social Change’ 0.91 (0.17) <.001 2.48 [1.79, 3.44]
OIS ‘Systemic Inequality’ 0.01 (0.17) .959 1.01 [0.72, 1.42]
MFQ-r ‘Traditionalism’ 0.11 (0.21) .594 0.89 [0.59, 1.36]
MFQ-r ‘Compassion’ 0.03 (0.21) .893 0.97 [0.65, 1.46]
MFQ-r ‘Liberty’ 0.66 (0.17) <.001 1.94 [1.38, 2.71]
EU vote intention coded as 0 = Remain, 1 = Leave. ‘Sex’ was coded as 0 = male, 1 = female. B
represents unstandardized log-odds.OR represents the odds of voting ‘Leave’. Political orientation ranges
from 5 (very liberal) to +5 (very conservative).
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for MFQ-r factor scores, by 2015 general election vote
n
Traditionalism Compassion Liberty
M SD M SD M SD
Conservatives 65 3.96 0.82 4.33 0.79 4.26 0.77
Labour 137 3.09 0.77 4.75 0.68 3.79 0.83
Liberal Democrats 47 3.05 0.76 4.57 0.52 4.13 0.78
UKIP 47 3.84 0.91 3.95 0.93 4.88 0.93
Green Party 49 2.64 0.80 4.62 0.87 3.92 0.80
MFQ-r factor scores range from 1 to 6, with high scores indicating greater levels of endorsement of the
respective moral domain.
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In the ‘Compassion’ domain, scores violated assumptions for normality and so the non-
parametric Kruskal–Wallis test was used, with post-hoc Dwass–Steel–Critchlow–Fligner
(DSCF) comparisons used. Conservative voters scored lower than those voting for Labour
(W = 5.29, p = .002, but did not differ significantly from the voters of any other parties
(ps ≥ .133. Elsewhere, UKIP voters scored significantly lower in ‘Compassion’ when
compared to Labour voters (W = 7.59, p < .001), Liberal Democrats (W = 5.02,
p = .004), and Green Party voters (W = 5.37, p = .001).
On the ‘Liberty’ factor, UKIP voters scored higher than those who voted for the
Conservatives (p = .001, d = 0.75), Labour (p < .001, d = 1.33), the Liberal Democrats
(p < .001, d = 0.91), and the Green Party (p < .001, d = 1.17). Further, Conservative
voters scored higher than Labour voters (p = .001,d = 0.58). No other comparisonswere
statistically significant.
To summarize Study 1, we found that combining Iyer et al.’s (2012) liberty-related
items with the existing MFQ led to a 3-factor structure comprised on ‘Traditionalism’,
‘Compassion’, and ‘Liberty’ domains. These were associated with self-reported political
orientation and voting behaviour in a manner that made theoretical sense (i.e.,
‘Traditionalism’ was associated with conservatism and rightward voting, ‘Compassion’
with liberalism and leftward voting, and ‘Liberty’ had a weak association with orientation
but predicted a strong preference for a Brexit vote).
Figure 2. Means plot for MFQ-r factor scores, by 2015 UK general election party vote. Error bars
represent 95% Cis.
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STUDY 2
In Study 2, we sought to confirm the factor structure reported in Study 1 and to further
offer evidence of this through a network analysis of MFQ-r. We also offer a further
exploratory analysis of the associations betweenMFQ-r domains and voting behaviour in a
more recent sample to replicate our previous results.
Methods
Participants
Participants for this study were recruited as part of a larger project pertaining to
ideological responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. This sample contains all those who
completed the MFQ in that project. Thus, a total of 322 participants (61% female;
Mage = 39.79 years, SD = 14.80) were included in this study. Participants were recruited
in line with those methods reported for Study 1, making use of Reddit political forum
discussions, and local interest community groups on Facebook. These methods allowed
us to sample a cross-section of the community that may be unavailable using traditional
student samples or via paid services such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Measures
Demographics
Participantswere asked to provide basic demographic information (sex, age, self-reported
political ideology, and past voting behaviour). Specifically, we asked about their voting in
the 2019 UK General Election and the 2016 EU referendum. We also asked about a
hypothetical re-run of the referendum to capture participants’ most recent views on this
topic. Inclusion criteria for participation dictated that all who completed the online
survey were over the age of 18 years and resident in the UK.
Moral foundations questionnaire
We again used the full 32-item MFQ (Graham et al., 2009) alongside Iyer et al.’s (2012)
liberty items in this study and used scoring syntax provided on MoralFoundations.org.
Average domain scores and internal consistency coefficients are provided in Table 6 (see
Results, below).
Unreported measures and tasks
As part of the broader project, we also asked participants to complete a measure
pertaining to their levels of fear of COVID-19 and to respond to some scenarios about the
flouting of governmental public health advice. The results of this study are reported at
Harper and Rhodes (2020).
Procedure
After clicking survey link, participants read information about the nature of the study
before affirming their consent. Participants provided demographic information, before
the MFQ and the fear of COVID-19 scale in a randomized order, followed by providing
their judgements of COVID-19 behavioural transgressions. As such, the completion of the
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MFQwas unaffected by potential exposure to COVID-related ideologically salient stimuli.
Once finished, all participants were comprehensively debriefed. This procedure was
approved by an institutional review committee and adhered to British Psychological
Society ethical guidelines.
Results
An anonymized version of the data set (in.omv format) is available for download at https://
osf.io/nwpb6/.
Confirmatory factor analysis
A confirmatory factor analysis was run on the MFQ data using the lavaan R package in
jamovi (Rosseel et al., 2020). We used the 3-factor MFQ-r structure reported in Study 1 as
the default model. We also ran a confirmatory analysis on the original MFQ structure to
replicate the findings of other teams (e.g., Iurino & Saucier, 2020; Kim et al., 2012;
Kivikangas et al., 2017; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Yilmaz et al., 2016).
The default model led to unacceptable model fit statistics, CFI = .77, TLI = .74,
RMSEA = .08 [90% CI: 0.08, 0.09]. As such, we examined modification indices, but none
of these led to changes that could be made within factors. We then examined residuals of
the observed correlation matrix, using  0.1 as a criterion for a potential issue. There
were several of these issues,with two ‘Liberty’ items and one ‘Compassion’ itemdeviation
Table 6. Item loadings in final confirmatory factor analysis
Factor Indicator Est. (SE)
95% CI (Est.)
p Stand. estimateLower Upper
Traditionalism RESPECT 1.16 (0.07) 1.02 1.29 <.001 0.82
KIDRESPECT 0.88 (0.07) 0.75 1.02 <.001 0.67
HARMLESSDG 0.76 (0.09) 0.58 0.94 <.001 0.47
DECENCY 0.99 (0.08) 0.83 1.13 <.001 0.67
DISGUSTING 0.86 (0.07) 0.72 1.00 <.001 0.63
TRADITIONS 0.90 (0.07) 0.76 1.04 <.001 0.66
UNNATURAL 0.66 (0.09) 0.49 0.83 <.001 0.44
LIBERTY_1 0.76 (0.07) 0.62 0.89 <.001 0.59
LOVECOUNTRY 0.98 (0.08) 0.83 1.14 <.001 0.66
Compassion UNFAIRLY 0.69 (0.06) 0.58 0.80 <.001 0.69
CRUEL 0.79 (0.06) 0.68 0.90 <.001 0.76
RIGHTS 0.59 (0.06) 0.47 0.71 <.001 0.56
WEAK 0.51 (0.06) 0.39 0.63 <.001 0.50
EMOTIONALLY 0.64 (0.06) 0.52 0.76 <.001 0.59
Liberty LIBERTY_4 0.78 (0.09) 0.60 0.96 <.001 0.61
LIBERTY_6 0.88 (0.09) 0.70 1.06 <.001 0.73
LIBERTY_9 0.39 (0.11) 0.18 0.61 <.001 0.25
LIBERTY_7r 0.57 (0.09) 0.40 0.74 <.001 0.45
‘Est.’ relates to unstandardized item loading. ‘Stand. Estimate’ represents the standardized coefficient.
Item loadings in earlier iterations of the confirmatory factor analysis are downloadable from the project
Open Science Framework page.
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from their predicted correlations across many other items. These items were removed
from the scale and the analysis re-run. Observing the residual correlation matrix once
again, we saw that one ‘Traditionalism’ item deviated from its predicted correlations with
almost all other items. A further ‘Liberty’ item also had a low standardized factor loading
(0.21). We therefore removed these items to improve model fit. A list of all item loadings
can be found in Table 6.
This led to improved model fit statistics, v2(132) = 335, p < .001, CFI = .87,
TLI = .85, RMSEA = .07 [90% CI: 0.06, 0.08]. These coefficients suggested that the
MFQ-r 3-factor model does not lead to a substantially worse fit (and in some cases in
superior) when compared to:
 The original 5-factor MFQ, CFI = .73, TLI = .70, RMSEA = .08.
 The traditional 6-factor MFQ, CFI = .66, TLI = .64, RMSEA = .08.
 A second-order 2-factor model (‘individualizing’—comprising the care and fairness
items—and ‘binding’—comprising the loyalty, authority, and purity items) for the
original MFQ, CFI = .72, TLI = .64, RMSEA = .08.
 A second-order 3-factor model (‘individualizing’ and ‘binding’, plus the Iyer et al.
‘liberty’ items) for the original MFQ, CFI = .66, TLI = .62, RMSEA = .08.
All models that were run can be downloaded fromhttps://osf.io/nwpb6/. This address
also contains the final version of the MFQ-r.
The Traditionalism (a = .85, McDonald’s x = .85) and Compassion (a = .76, McDon-
ald’s x = .76) MFQ-r factors demonstrated acceptable levels of reliability. Liberty,
however, fell short of the level of acceptability (a = .54, McDonald’s x = .59). This likely
stems from an issue with the collection of liberty items put forward by Iyer et al. (2012),
which in its original form also had low levels of internal consistency (a = .63). On the
original MFQ, internal consistency was acceptable for the binding foundations of loyalty,
authority, and purity (as = .74, .79, .71), but not for the individualizing foundations of
care/harm and fairness (as = .66, .61). As such, while acknowledging the limitations of
the MFQ-r, we argue that its better fit and otherwise strong internal consistency offers a
superior measurement structure of moral intuitions than does the original MFQ format.
Moral domain scores for eachmodel, and their inter-correlations, are presented inTable 7.
Parallel network analysis of the revised MFQ
Anetwork is an abstract representation of a systemof related variables. Such analyses have
recently gained popularity in survey design as an alternative to confirmatory and
exploratory factor analyses (e.g., van Borkulo et al., 2015; Borsboom, 2008; Boschloo, van
Borkulo, Borsboom, & Schoevers, 2016; Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, & Borsboom,
2010; van der Maas et al., 2006; McNally et al., 2015; van de Leemput et al., 2014).
A network has two primary components: nodes and edges. Nodes represent the
variables of interest in a study (i.e., scale items) and edges connect the nodes into a
superstructure via their pairwise interactions. Once a network is formed, network
analysis gives us the power to observe complex relationships between variables, but also
to study themost important or least important nodeswithin a system (Borsboom, Cramer,
Schmittmann, Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011; see also Costantini et al., 2019; Dalege,
Borsboom, vanHarreveld, & van derMaas, 2017; Epskamp, Borsboom,& Fried, 2018).We
leveraged network analysis to provide a complimentary investigation of the MFQ-r and its
structure, owing to the borderline acceptable levels of some model fit statistics. It is
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important to note that we performed the following network analysis completely blind.
That is, we did not tell the network anything about the expected structure of the MFQ-r
(i.e., the network was untrained).
We submitted all the MFQ items to a network analysis in JASP (JASP Team, 2020).
EBICglasso network analysis (Epskam, Cramer, Waldorp, Schmittmann, & Borsboom
et al., 2012; Epskam et al., 2018) was used to generate the network illustrated in Figure 3.
This approach takes the individual elements of a network and imposes lasso regularization
which estimates a concentration matrix. The glasso method maximizes a penalized log-
likelihood (instead of a log-likelihood function), with the penalty equal to the tuning
parameter kmultiplied by the absolute sumof the elementswithin a concentrationmatrix
(Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2008). We used the Extended Bayesian Information
Criterion (EBIC; Chen & Chen, 2008; Epskamp, 2016; Foygel & Drton, 2010) to estimate
the network, which takes into account model complexity and model fit (to penalize over-
fittedmodels). This results in networks that aremore accurate and easier to interpret than
other methods (Tibshirani, 1996). We used the ‘spring’ method of the Frutherman-
Reingold visualization algorithm (Fruchterman & Reingold, 1991), which is based on the
strengths of the edges between nodes, to produce the network.
By visually inspecting the network we can immediately see the presence of three
separate communities. Allied to this, the centrality plot in Figure 4 highlights the degree,
Figure 3. Anetwork of theMFQ. Red lines indicate negative associations between symptoms; blue lines
indicate positive associations between symptoms; thicker lines indicate stronger associations. To
facilitate interpretation, we have coloured the nodes that correspond to the MFQ-r domains of
Traditionalism, Compassion, and Liberty. Yellow nodes represent items that were removed from the
MFQ after the exploratory factor analysis (Study 1) and CFA (Study 2).
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expected influence, betweenness, and closeness of the nodes within the network. The
degree and expected influence parameters for each node tell us about the importance of
that node within the network. As shown in Figure 4, the RESPECT item (‘Whether or not
someone showed a lack of respect for authority’) has the highest expected influence and
degree scores, and as such has strong and direct connections with many other nodes.
Nodes can also be central in terms of their betweenness, which indexes how often a node
is the shortest distance between two other nodes. The closeness parameter indexes how
many indirect and direct paths are ‘shorter’ between nodes. The strongest and most
influential MFQ nodes are highlighted in Figure 4. Critically, the most interesting
observation from this analysis is that the clusters of nodes identified from the network
almost perfectly correspond to the results of our exploratory and confirmatory factor
analyses, giving converging evidence from different statistical techniques that the MFQ
should be conceptualized in line with the MFQ-r.
Figure 4. A Centrality plot of the MFQ. The plot is standardized (M = 0, SD = 1), where larger scores
indicate greater centrality for eachmeasure.Most central items aremarkedwith an orange dot for clarity.
18 Craig A. Harper and Darren Rhodes
Concurrent validity of the revised MFQ (Study 2)
We sought to replicate the findings of Study 1 by examining the relationships between the
MFQ-r domains and self-reported political ideology, voting in the 2019 UK General
Election, and preferences over the Brexit issue. Althoughwe asked participants both their
actual EU referendum vote and their hypothetical preference in a hypothetical re-run of
the vote, we only analysed data for the latter of these as it was the more temporally valid
outcome in our cross-sectional design. Owing to the function of this analysis, we did not
make any formal hypotheses at the outset.
Consistent with Study 1, self-reported conservatism was positively related to
endorsing MFQ-r Traditionalism (r = .51, p < .001), and negatively related to endorsing
MFQ-r Compassion (r = .12, p = .030). However, the magnitude of the associated with
scores on the Compassion domain was around half of that reported in Study 1. The small
relationship between conservatism and MFQ-r Liberty was consistent with Study 1
(r = .18, p = .002).
‘Traditionalism’ scores were not normally distributed, and there were unequal
variances between groups; this violated the assumptions for ANOVA, and so non-
parametric testswere used.We found significant effects of ‘party vote’ in relation toMFQ-r
Traditionalism ( v2(3) = 93.90, p < .001, e2 = 0.30) and MFQ-r Liberty (F(3, 315) = 5.41,
p = .001), but not MFQ-r Compassion (F(3, 315) = 0.51, p = .675). Examining the mean
scores on each variable (Table 8), Conservative Party voters and those who did not vote
scored higher on the MFQ-r Traditionalism domain (comparative to Labour Party and
‘other’ voters; all ps < .001, d = 0.48). The effect of Party vote for MFQ-r Liberty was
driven by higher scores among Conservatives than those who voted for either Labour
(p = .004) or another unnamed Party (p = .014, d = 0.50).
We ran a binary logistic regression predicting current preferences in the Brexit debate.
Sex, age, self-reported political ideology, and the three MFQ-r domains were entered as
predictors. There was no evidence of multicollinearity in the model, with VIF (all < 1.47)
and tolerance coefficients (all > 0.68) being acceptable. This model was statistically
significant, v2(6) = 161, p < .001, Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = .583. The model accurately
classified 85.7%of the sample into their respective preferences and, consistentwith Study
1, was more accurate when predicting a preference for ‘Remain’ (89.4%) than for ‘Leave’
(77.4%). Model coefficients are presented in Table 9.
Examining the coefficients, voting ‘Leave’ was predicted by older age, higher
conservatism, and a greater endorsement of the MFQ-r domains of Traditionalism and
Liberty. MFQ-r Compassion was unrelated to Brexit attitudes.
For comparison, the 6-factor MFQ also led to a significant regression model,
v2(9) = 169, p < .001, Nagelkerke pseudo R2 = .599. This model correctly classified a
Table 8. Descriptive statistics for MFQ-r factor scores, by 2019 general election vote
MFQ-r domain
Traditionalism Compassion Liberty
The Conservative Party (n = 82) 4.43 (0.67) 4.85 (0.78) 3.59 (0.95)
The Labour Party (n = 147) 3.34 (0.88) 4.77 (0.76) 3.18 (0.76)
Another Party (n = 67) 3.25 (0.87) 4.77 (0.0) 3.16 (0.86)
Did not vote (n = 24) 3.13 (0.70) 4.93 (0.57) 3.56 (0.98)
Values represent mean values with  1 SD in parentheses.
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similar proportion of the sample to that described for the MFQ-r (total = 85.9%;
‘Remain’ = 90.5%; ‘Leave’ = 75.8%). Within the model the effect of political orientation
remained consistent. For the MFQ, endorsement of the fairness foundation (OR = 0.39,
p = .009) predicted lower odds of voting ‘Leave’,while this choicewasmore likely among
those who endorsed the loyalty (OR = 1.90, p = .040), purity (OR = 2.02, p = .029), and
liberty foundations (OR = 3.29, p < .001). These data are broadly consistent with
previous data sets (e.g., Harper & Hogue, 2019).
STUDY 2 SUMMARY
To summarize Study 2, we were able to confirm the 3-factor MFQ-r structure that was
reported in Study 1 using both confirmatory factor analysis and network analyses. We
were also able to replicate (with some changes in the magnitude of correlations) the
associations between the MFQ-r and both political orientation and voting behaviour.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overview of key findings
This paper has presented a reanalysis of the MFQ in response to criticisms about the
measure’s unreliable factor structure (Davis et al., 2017; Iurino& Saucier, 2020; Kim et al.,
2012; Kivikangas et al., 2017; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Yilmaz et al., 2016) and poor
internal consistency at the foundation level (Graham et al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Harper &
Hogue, 2019).
Parallel analysis indicated that five factors underpinned theMFQ (when also including
the liberty items produced by Iyer et al., 2012). However, only three of these met our
criteria for psychometric (minimum five items) in the initial exploratory factor analysis)
and theoretical meaningfulness. These factors were labelled ‘Traditionalism’, ‘Compas-
sion’, and ‘Liberty’. Each of these factors contained clear and unique themes, were
unrelated to each other, andwere internally consistent. Further, concurrent validity of the
‘Traditionalism’ and ‘Compassion’ factors was supported via significant correlations with
‘social change’ insecurities (positive and negative relationships, respectively) and
anxieties about ‘systemic inequality’ (negative and positive relationships, respectively).
In turn, ‘Traditionalism’ was correlated with political conservatism, ‘Compassion’ with
political liberalism, and ‘Liberty’ was slightly associated with a rightward-leaning political
orientation. Significant differences in the endorsement of these threemoral domainswere
Table 9. Binary logistic regression predicting Brexit views using the MFQ-r
B (SE) p OR 95% CI (OR)
Sex 0.33 (0.38) .394 1.388 [0.65, 2.95]
Age 0.02 (0.01) .023 1.028 [1.00, 1.05]
Political Orientation 0.78 (0.13) <.001 2.179 [1.69, 2.81]
MFQ-r ‘Traditionalism’ 0.94 (0.30) .002 2.559 [1.43, 4.58]
MFQ-r ‘Compassion’ 0.21 (0.31) .490 0.810 [0.45, 1.47]
MFQ-r ‘Liberty’ 0.88 (0.23 <.001 2.400 [1.54, 3.74]
EU vote intention coded as 0 = Remain, 1 = Leave. ‘Sex’ was coded as 0 = male, 1 = female. B
represents unstandardized log-odds.OR represents the odds of voting ‘Leave’. Political orientation ranges
from 1 (very liberal) to 10 (very conservative).
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found when comparing the voter groups. That is, ‘Traditionalism’ was more strongly
endorsed by those who voted for right-leaning parties (e.g., the Conservatives and UKIP),
while ‘Compassion’ was more strongly endorsed by those who voted for the political left
(e.g., Labour, Liberal Democrats, and the Green Party). ‘Liberty’ was generally endorsed at
an equal level across the voting spectrum, with the exception being among UKIP voters
who were the group to most strongly endorse ‘Liberty’-based moral principles. While
these party-specific differences were only observed in Study 1 (indicating that moral
intuitions may be particularly influential during election periods), they were broadly
consistent across both studies when considering the more pervasive issue of Britain’s
membership of the EU. In this case, traditionalism (or aspects of this construct, such as
insecurities about systemic change) and liberty were associated with a greater propensity
to favour the vote to leave the EU, consistent with previous research using the 5-factor
MFQ model (Harper & Hogue, 2019).
The confirmatory factor analysis presented in Study 2 was less clear-cut than Study 1
may have predicted. Several items loaded poorly onto their initial components, leading to
their removal from the final MFQ-r. The resultant scale demonstrated broadly acceptable
model fit indices in relation to SRMR and RMSEA consistent with past work on the MFQ
(albeit with superior internal consistency coefficients in this revised structure). Further,
the 3-factor structure fit the data better than the initial 5-factor structure, or the extended
6-factor structure brought about by combining the initial MFQ with Iyer et al.’s (2012)
liberty items.
Implications of these data
The analyses presented in this paper have implications for the ways in which the MFT is
conceptualized and measured. From a conceptual perspective, the lack of confirmatory
support for a 5-factorMFQstructure in previous studies (Iurino&Saucier, 2020;Kimet al.,
2012; Kivikangas et al., 2017; Yilmaz et al., 2016), or a 6-factor structure in the exploratory
work undertaken in the current paper, raises doubt about this model. In short, these data
do not support MFT’s 5-factor structure.
In support of this view, some researchers have dispensed with the 5- or 6-factor
structure and instead use the broad categories of ‘individualizing’ (a combination of care
and fairness) and ‘binding’ (a combination of authority, loyalty, and purity) foundations
(see Alper & Yilmaz, 2020; Barnett et al., 2018; Malka et al., 2016; Napier & Luguri, 2013;
Smith, Aquino, Koleva, & Graham, 2014). These cited works do not consider Iyer et al.’s
(2012) liberty-related items, as they did not form a core part of the initial MFQ (Graham
et al., 2009, 2012). There are conceptual links between ‘Traditionalism’ and binding
foundations, and between ‘Compassion’ and individualization. Adopting the 3-factor
structure of the MFQ-r would be consistent with this prior work, while also incorporating
the liberty foundation into a core measure of the MFT.While an objection to parsimony in
favour of a more pluralistic view of morality is a cornerstone of the MFT (Graham et al.,
2013), the available data seem to suggest that a more parsimonious model is better
reflective of the empirical structure of morality, at least in relation to the contents of the
MFQ as it is currently formulated. That said, even the MFQ-r presented here should be
considered a preliminary or temporary solution to a problem that has dogged the MFQ
literature for some time. The initial development paper for the MFQ (Graham et al., 2009)
provided little detail about the formal psychometric development process, including how
items were selected for inclusion on the questionnaire. Given the popularity and
widespread use of themoral foundations framework, a substantive field-wide projectmay
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benecessary topool resources and systematically test a larger pool of potentialMFQ items.
Thus, we are not advocating the MFQ-r as the final form of the MFQ. Instead, it offers a
better version than the current form and may be a psychometrically stronger option than
the former iteration. However, more widespread and systematic work is required to
produce a measure that best reflects the true structure of moral intuitions (see below).
In terms of the broader implications of moving forward (at least temporarily) with the
3-factor structure, it appears as though the endorsement of ‘Traditionalism’ and
‘Compassion’ moral domains are more linked to higher level political identity (in the
current sample, this relates to self-placement on the left-right political spectrum, andparty
vote choice) than is the ‘Liberty’ domain. This is exemplified in the significant (and
opposite) correlations between ‘Traditionalism’ and ‘Compassion’ with political orien-
tation, and the significant differences between voters of the various political parties in
relation to average scores on these factors. As such, ‘Traditionalism’ may represent a core
moral concern for those who are temperamentally inclined to express a broad suite of
conservative-typical viewpoints (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010; Johnson &
Tamney, 2001), while ‘Compassion’ appears to represent the core moral value of those
with a liberal political identity (see also Hirsch, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010).
For ‘Liberty’, the relationship to political beliefs and behaviour appearsmore nuanced.
While a small significant correlation was observed with political orientation (in the
direction of political conservatism), the magnitude of this relationship leaves the
meaningfulness of this link open to doubt. Instead, it may be that, as opposed to broad
ideological positions and fixed partisan identity, a predominant endorsement of the
‘Liberty’ moral domain (comparative to ‘Traditionalism’ and ‘Compassion’) informs
policy-specific decision-making. That is, in the current sample, it was those participants
who voted for UKIP (the party most vocally supporting a ‘Leave’ vote in the 2016
referendum on EU membership) in 2015 who endorsed the ‘Liberty’ domain to the
greatest extent. In line with this, the newly conceptualized ‘Liberty’ domain was a strong
predictor of an intended ‘Leave’ vote in the current sample, as was the full (Iyer et al.,
2012) liberty foundation measure in Harper and Hogue’s (2019) work on the psycho-
logical underpinnings of the Brexit vote.
Limitations and future directions
The work presented in this paper should be viewed as exploratory in nature and as such
does require confirmation in large, independent, and cross-cultural samples. The use of
exclusively British samples is a major limitation of this work. At present, no large
international data sets exist wherein the full 30-item MFQ and the liberty items from Iyer
et al. (2012) have been administered. This prevented us from testing measurement
invariance across samples and countries. In previous work, the structure MFQ has not
been invariant, meaning that the 5-factor model hypothesized in MFT may not be
applicable across cultures (Iurino & Saucier, 2020). Although this past work used the 20-
item short formof theMFQ, there is little reason to believe this does not translate to the full
form, or indeed the liberty items. However, recent work by Brandt et al. (2020) suggests
that a lack of measurement invariance in ideological measures do not affect conclusions
about political differences.
Nonetheless, as stated earlier, the data do suggest that furtherwork on theMFQmay be
warranted in order to improve the confidence that social scientists canhave its validity and
utility. The 3-factor structure itselfmay be questioned, owing to the limited itempool used
to develop it. That is, the 41 items used in the PCA were sourced from the original MFQ
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(Graham et al., 2011) and the liberty items produced by Iyer et al. (2012). As such, it may
be that these items themselves introduced bias to the measures and that a larger pool of
potentially morality-relevant items could yield a different factor structure (see also Curry
et al., 2019). Given the efficiency of online crowdsourcing for social scientific research
(Hauser & Schwarz, 2016), it may be possible to generate a large pool of potential items,
fromacross the ideological spectrum, for eachof themoral foundations. Data in relation to
this large item pool could then be subject to factor analytic procedures in order to test
competingmodels, such as the 2-factor ‘individualizing-binding’ foundationsmodel, the 3-
factor model reported here, and the 5- and 6-factormodels advanced in the orthodoxMFT
literature. It may be that a hierarchical model, perhaps with the three MFQ-r domains as
superordinate factors, might be the optimal solution. If so, future work might try to
develop scales that increase the discrimination of these proposed moral foundations, or
even to try to generate a new lower-order structure. Conducting thisworkwas beyond the
scope of this individual paper andwill require broad collaboration across research groups
internationally to study the true nature of human moral intuitions. We would encourage
scholars to make use of collaborative open science platforms (e.g., StudySwap; https://
osf.io/meetings/studyswap/) to bring this much needed endeavour to fruition. Such
collaborative workmight equally confirm the predictive validity of theMFQ-r in a range of
sociopolitical domains (e.g., voting behaviour, specific policy attitudes, prosocial, and
interpersonal behaviours).
From a practical perspective, more work on the predictive validity of the three factors
of the MFQ-r could lead to more developed insights pertaining to political decision-
making. This is particularly the case in relation to the ‘Liberty’ domain, which may be less
tied to fixed political allegiances and more amenable to issue-specific changes in voting
habits. For example, in the current sample, this domain was highest among 2015 UKIP
voters, potentially due to this party advocating for a ‘Leave’ vote in the 2016 referendum
and liberty being a key predictor of a preference for this outcome (see Harper & Hogue,
2019). However, the UKIP vote collapsed in subsequent general elections, with the
Conservative Party gainingmany of these votes following a realignment to see-through the
Brexit process (Cutts, Goodwin, Heath, & Surridge, 2020). Future longitudinal studies,
tracking voting preferences over time in response to specific political issues, could
illuminate how the ‘Liberty’ domain affects judgements of specific political issues.
Conclusions
This paper has presented a reanalysis of Graham et al.’s (2009) MFQ, taking into account
the later addition of items related to the liberty foundation (Iyer et al., 2012) and recent
questions being raised about the MFQ’s factor structure and internal consistency. The
three factors underpinning the MFQ-r may reflect a more parsimonious model of morality
that (a) is consistent with previous theorizing about the nature of morality and (b) is
predictive of relevant political outcomes. Future research on the generalizability of the
MFQ-r’s psychometric structure is needed, but this refinedmeasure offers thepotential for
acting as a springboard for the more psychometrically rigorous assessment of the
influence of core moral domains on political attitudes and behaviour.
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